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Abstract—Differing from applying steganography on storage 
cover media, steganography on Voice over IP (VoIP) must often 
delicately balance between providing adequate security and 
maintaining low latency for real-time services. This paper 
presents a novel real-time steganography model for VoIP that 
aims at providing good security for secret messages without 
sacrificing real-time performance. We achieve this goal by 
employing the well-known least-significant-bits (LSB) substitu-
tion approach to provide a reasonable tradeoff between the 
adequate information hiding requirement (good security and 
sufficient capacity) and the low latency requirement for VoIP. 
Further, we incorporate the m-sequence technique to eliminate 
the correlation among secret messages to resist the statistical 
detection based on the fact that the distribution of the LSBs in the 
stego-speech is not uniform and to provide a short-term security 
protection of secret messages. To accurately recover secret 
messages at the receiver side, we design a synchronization 
mechanism based on the RSA key agreement and the synchro-
nized sequence transmission using techniques of the protocol 
steganography, which can effectively enhance the flexibility of the 
covert communication system and be extended to other stegano-
graphy schemes based on real-time systems. We evaluate the 
effectiveness of our model with ITU-T G.729a as the codec of the 
cover speech in StegTalk, a covert communication system based 
on VoIP. The experimental results demonstrate that our tech-
niques provide good security and transparency for transmitting 
secret messages while adequately meeting the real-time require-
ment of VoIP.1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As one of the effective solutions for Internet-based secure 
communications, steganography has attracted increasing interest. 
It provides a secure protection for secret messages by embedding 
them into digital media and making them inconspicuous and 
invisible to eavesdroppers. In contrast to the traditional crypto-
graphy whose purpose is to hide the content of secret messages 
being exchanged between the two communicating parties, the 
purpose of steganography is to hide not only the content but also 
its very existence. Therefore, it can offer a better security in many 
ways. 
Recently, techniques with steganography at the core have been 
employed successfully in covert exchange of information [1-2], 
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copyright protection [3], etc. However, most of the previous 
studies on steganography are carried out on storage cover media 
[4] and by contrast the area of steganography in real-time 
systems is largely unexplored. However, due to their instantane-
ity, real-time systems can potentially offer better security for 
hiding secret messages. Therefore, in this study we will focus on 
one of the typical real-time communication systems, Voice over 
IP (VoIP), as a possible carrier to apply steganography to 
enhance security for secret messages while maintaining good 
performance for VoIP real-time services. 
VoIP is a promising technique to enable telephone calls via a 
broadband Internet connection. Owing to its advantages of low 
cost and advanced flexible digital features, VoIP has become a 
popular alternative to the public-switched telephone network 
(PSTN), and extensive research on it has been conducted [5]. The 
main motivations for our VoIP-based steganography study are 
twofold. First, the ongoing conversation of VoIP can offer an 
ideal camouflage for secret messages, because the voice data is 
naturally assumed to be the only data carried in a given VoIP 
channel. Second, a typically short VoIP connection does not give 
eavesdroppers sufficient amount of time to detect possible 
abnormity due to hidden messages. 
From the literature [6-8], some researchers have noticed the 
advantages of and carried out useful studies on steganography 
over VoIP. Wang et al. [6] proposed a scheme for transmitting 
secret speeches based on information hiding in VoIP systems. 
Their hiding process consists of two steps: compressing the 
secret speeches and then filling their binary bits directly into the 
LSBs of cover speech coded with G.711. Dittmann et al. [7] 
presented a more general scheme of steganography over VoIP, 
which can be used to transmit arbitrary secret messages. How-
ever, both of these implemented steganography techniques only 
directly replace the LSBs of the cover speech with the binary bits 
of secret messages, which is vulnerable to detection by the 
steganalysis algorithm subsequently proposed by Dittmann et al. 
[7]. Their steganalysis algorithm is based on the fact that the 
distribution of the LSBs in the stego-speech is not uniform, 
which can detect directly embedded messages with a success rate 
of approximately 98.60%.Therefore, Dittmann et al. [7, 8] 
suggested that messages be encrypted prior to embedding to 
improve security. Motivated by this view, they later proposed a 
scheme that introduces the cryptographies (i.e. Twofish, Tiger) 
for embedded messages [8]. However, the encryption operation 
must be carried out offline before the embedding operation, 
An M-Sequence Based Steganography Model for 
Voice over IP 
University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Computer Science and Engineering
Technical Report TR-UNL-CSE-2008-0007
Issued Sept. 10, 2008
 because the adopted cryptographies are often time-consuming 
and incur delays that may in turn degrade the speech quality 
drastically. Therefore, this method is not well suit for the 
real-time exchanging of secret messages. In fact, for the real-time 
covert communication we must strike an acceptable balance 
between providing adequate security and maintaining low 
latency for real-time services. In addition, the authors of [8] 
assumed that the two communicating parties must share the same 
knowledge of the used key, but did not reveal how the key is 
distributed, which is actually a crucial component for covert 
communication systems. 
In this paper, we present a novel model of real-time stegano-
graphy based on m-sequence in VoIP. Our technique aims at 
providing good security of real-time covert communication 
without sacrificing the real-time performance that is vital for 
VoIP. M-sequence has been employed widely in the code 
division multiple access (CDMA) technique and other spread 
spectrum communications. In our model, m-sequence is mainly 
used to eliminate the correlation among secret messages to resist 
the statistical detection mentioned above and to provide a 
short-term secure protection of secret messages. Moreover, we 
design a secure synchronization mechanism based on the RSA 
key agreement and the synchronized sequence transmission 
using techniques of the protocol steganography. The purpose of 
the synchronization mechanism is to safely distribute some 
important parameters to the receiver to correctly restitute secret 
messages. In addition, it is worth noting that this mechanism can 
also be extended for secure online distribution of key or/and 
important parameters in [8] and other steganography schemes 
based on real-time systems. Consequently, the two communica-
tion parties can momentarily decide to construct a covert com-
munication during the working process of real-time systems 
(online) without the need for parameters requests or/and key 
agreements before running the systems (offline). Finally, we 
evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed model with ITU-T 
G.729a as the codec of the cover speech in StegTalk. The 
experimental results demonstrate that our techniques provide 
good security and transparency for transmitting secret messages 
while adequately meeting the real-time requirement of VoIP. 
 
II. M SEQUENCE 
 
Fig. 1. The n-degree linear feedback shift register 
M sequence is a typical pseudorandom binary sequence with 
the longest period. It has two properties that make it similar to 
zero-mean white noise: the numbers of ones and zeros are 
almost equal, and the autocorrelation function is as near to a 
delta function as we hope for [9].Therefore, it has been widely 
employed in the spread spectrum technique. M sequence is 
often generated by a linear feedback shift register (LFSR). Fig. 
1 depicts an n-degree LFSR.  In the figure, ai = 0 or 1 (i = 0, 
1, …, n-1), which indicates the state of the ith shift register; ci = 
0 or 1, which indicates the state of the ith feedback line. If ci = 1, 
the ith feedback line is connected; otherwise, it is disconnected. 
M sequence consists of all the output bits. In addition, the 
vector {a0,  a1, …, an-1} indicates the current state of LFSR. 
Generally, if the current state of LFSR is {ak-n,  ak-n+1, …, ak-1}, 
the next state is determined by the following steps: 1) output-
ting ak-n; 2) shifting right all other bits by a position; and 3) 
calculating a new input of the nth register (ak) by the following 
formula: 
( )1 1 2 2
1
mod 2
n
k k k n k n i k i
i
a c a c a c a c a?− − − −=∑= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ =    (1) 
That is, the new state of LFSR depends on the following 
characteristic polynomial: 
2
0 1 2
0
( )
nn i
n i
i
f x c c x c x c x c x?
=
∑= + + + + =           (2) 
If we choose one of the primitive polynomials as the cha-
racteristic polynomial, we can obtain the m sequence with the 
longest period P = 2n-1, i.e. {a0, a1, …, ap-1, a0, a1, …, ap-1, a0, 
a1, … }. In addition, we can generate different m sequences 
with different initial states for an LFSR with a given degree. 
The total quantity of m sequences generated by an n-degree 
LFSR can be calculated via the following formula: 
( ) (2 1) (2 1)n nq n nφ= − ⋅ −                        (3) 
where, φ (n) is the Euler’s function that can be stated as 
follows: 
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where, each pi (i = 1, 2, …, m) is a unique prime number that 
is different from all the others. Furthermore, if the degree of 
LFSR is chosen from 1 to N, the quantity of m sequences 
generated by LFSR with different degrees can be calculated by 
the following formula: 
1
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III. PROPOSED MODEL 
 
Fig. 2. Steganography in VoIP  
Fig. 2 depicts a general framework of steganography in VoIP. 
Let us assume that Alice (the sender) wants to transmit secret 
messages to Bob (the receiver), while they are talking about 
some inconspicuous topics via the VoIP system. For that, Alice 
embeds some secret messages into the voice with an embedding 
algorithm; after the voice is sent through the VoIP channel, Bob 
 retrieves the secret messages with the corresponding restituting 
algorithm. In this paper, we construct our steganography model 
based on encryption with the m sequence and well-known LSB 
substitution that provides a reasonable tradeoff between the 
adequate requirement (good security and sufficient capacity) 
for information hiding and the low latency requirement for 
VoIP.  
A. Embedding and Restituting Algorithm 
The purpose of the embedding algorithm is to hide secret 
messages behind the voice samples for security. Let us assume 
that Alice wants to send L bits of secret messages M = {mi = 0 
or 1| i = 0, 1, …, L-1}; the n-degree LFSR is adopted to produce 
the m sequence X = {xi = 0 or 1| i = 0, 1, …, P-1, P = 2n - 1},  
where P is the period of the m sequence; The LSB set of each 
frame of the speech coded by a given codec  is B = {bi = 0 or 1| 
i = 0, 1, …, S-1}, where S denotes the total number of the LSBs 
in each frame. The embedding algorithm can be formalized as 
follows: 
1
0
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where, M* = {mi* = 0 or 1| i = 0, 1, …, L-1} is the secure form 
of M; j = i mod P; k = i mod S; ⊕ is the Exclusive OR operation; 
and⊗ is the operation of bit substitution, i.e. ∀ y1, y2 = 0 or 1, 
y1 ⊗ y2 = y1. 
The restituting algorithm, whose purpose is to extract the 
hidden secret messages, consists of two steps: extracting the 
cipher M* and deciphering it. The process can be formalized as 
follows: 
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where, j = i mod P and k = i mod S. 
B. Synchronization Mechanism 
 
Fig. 3. The structure of the header 
The receiver often knows exactly the LSBs of voice samples 
and the generation algorithm of the m sequence that are adopted 
at the sender side. However, in order to restitute all secret 
messages accurately, the receiver must ascertain other three 
parameters: the length of secret messages (LoM), the degree 
(D), and the initial state (IS) of LFSR. Therefore, before 
sending the encrypted secret messages, the sender should first 
transmit the three parameters to the receiver. For the sake of 
privacy, the parameters should be encrypted with a public key 
cryptography. In our work, we choose the RSA algorithm that 
is employed widely in the key negotiation and the identification 
processes. Consequently, we can define a header as shown in 
Fig. 3. In the figure, RSA (D, IS, LoM) denotes the cipher (C) of 
the three parameters encrypted with the public key of the 
receiver. The parameter LoC indicates the total length of C. It is 
often set as a fixed size, in the interest of exact parsing. After 
retrieving LoC, the receiver can extract C from the LSBs of the 
voice samples and obtain the three parameters by deciphering C 
with his (her) private key. 
 
Fig. 4. The fields available for steganography in IP header 
 
Fig. 5. The covert communication scheme based on VoIP 
Furthermore, we define two synchronization patterns (SPs): 
Beginning of Header (BoH) and Beginning of Message (BoM) 
marking the start of the header and the start of the message 
respectively. Only upon detecting SPs can the receiver begin to 
extract the hidden data and carry out other relevant operations. 
In order to minimize the operations on voice samples, we do not 
embed SPs into the LSBs of voice samples, and instead employ 
the protocol steganography techniques that utilize the fact that 
few headers in packets are changed during transmission [10]. 
As described in [10], an IP header contains some fields that are 
available for steganography. Those fields are marked in Fig. 4 
with italics. The total capacity of the fields amounts to 64 bits 
per packet. There are some fields in UDP and RTP headers left 
to be used. Therefore, we can distribute the SPs among those 
fields in a predetermined fashion. SPs are often of short length 
(e.g. 8bits) and altered continually, so such a type of transmis-
sion is potentially hard to discover. 
 Using the above synchronization mechanism, we can de-
scribe the covert communication process as follows (as Fig.5 
shows): the sender transmits the header (H) to the receiver by 
embedding BoH into the first packet and H into the VoIP 
stream; after this, the sender transmits the encrypted secret 
message (M*) by embedding BoM into the first packet and M* 
into the VoIP stream. At the receiver side, upon detecting BoH 
the receiver parses D, IS and LoM from the succeeding H, and 
waits for the forthcoming M*. After detecting BoM, the receiver 
extracts M* from the VoIP stream according the length indi-
cated by LoM, and restitutes the original secret messages. In 
addition, there are other two key operations: 1) The sender must 
ensure that SPs do not appear in the header of each packet, if he 
(she) does not want to send secret messages; 2) Whenever not 
receiving any hidden information, the receiver must conti-
nuously check SPs so as to detect new transmissions of secret 
messages in a timely manner. 
 
IV. EVALUATION 
 
Fig. 6. Architecture of StegTalk 
We evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of our model in 
StegTalk, a prototypical covert communication system based 
on VoIP. Fig. 6 shows its architecture. In this system, the VoIP 
communication is constructed based on JVoIPLIB [11], a free 
library providing a primitive VoIP model. In addition, the 
system supports typical codecs, such as ITU-T G.711, G.723.1, 
G.729a, etc. In the tests, we choose G.729a as the codec of the 
cover speech. G.729a is an algorithm for the coding of speech 
signals at 8kbit/s using conjugate-structure alge-
braic-code-excited linear prediction, and operates on speech 
frames (80 bits per frame) of 10 ms corresponding to 80 
samples at a sampling rate of 8000 samples per second [12]. Su 
and Huang [13] found that the parameters of fixed codebook in 
G.729a have the best transparency for information hiding. 
Motivated by this observation, we examine the impacts of these 
parameters, and define two covert rates, 8 bits per frame (0.8 
kb/s, denoted by R1) and 26 bits per frame (2.6 kb/s, denoted by 
R2). Moreover, our system can vary the degree of LFSR from 1 
to 60. In other words, according to Formula (5), the total 
quantity of m sequences that can be generated in our system is 
1.4854 × 1034, an astronomically large space in which the 
potential attacker can hardly decipher the embedded secret 
messages in a short time。 Therefore, our system can provide 
sufficient short-term protection for secret messages. In the tests, 
we also focus on other two key issues, i.e. impacts of stega-
nography on speech quality and the additional delay due to the 
proposed algorithms. 
A. Speech Quality 
In order to evaluate the impact of steganography upon 
speech quality, we contrast the spectrograms of the cover 
speeches without steganography and with steganography at R1 
and R2 respectively. We choose the word “Hello” (P1) and the 
phrase “It is nice to meet you” (P2) as the cover speeches, and 
the text in section VI (references) as the secret message. 
Moreover, we randomly choose the degree and the initial state 
of LFSR. After encoding by G.729a, P1 has 50 frames, and P2 
has 126 frames. Consequently, P1 conceals 400 bits of message 
at R1 and 1300 bits at R2; P2 conceals 1008 bits of message at R1 
and 3276 bits at R2. Fig. 7 shows the spectrograms of the 
original speeches and their steganographical versions with 
secret messages embedded at R1 and R2 respectively. The 
spectrograms at R1 show very slight differences from the 
original spectrograms, indicating that the speech quality 
degradation at R1 is nearly negligible; the spectrograms at R2 
show a few visible differences from the original spectrograms, 
suggesting that the speech quality degradation at R2 may be 
faintly perceivable, but not enough to impact the understanding 
of the cover speeches. Therefore, our techniques can provide 
good transparency for steganography. These conclusions are 
also consistent with the results of the Mean Opinion Score 
(MOS) experiment that is used popularly in speech quality tests 
(See Table 1). In the MOS experiment, each MOS score is a 
mapping of perceived levels of the distortion into either the 
descriptive terms "excellent, good, fair, poor, unsatisfactory". 
 
Fig. 7. Spectrograms contrast of P1 and P2 
TABLE I 
UNITS FOR MAGNETIC PROPERTIES 
Speech Original At R1 At R2 
MOS 4.0 3.7 3.0 
B. Embedding Latency 
Another crucial issue to evaluate is the performance impact 
of our algorithms on the real-time services of VoIP. To meet the 
real-time requirement of VoIP, the additional delay due to the 
 proposed algorithms must not noticeably impact the normal 
workings of VoIP. In our model, the additional delay is mostly 
induced by the embedding algorithm, so we focus on the 
processing time of the embedding algorithm. We test the 
average embedding time (AET) per frame using LFSR with 
different degrees at R1 and R2 respectively on Intel Celeron 
2.66GHZ computers with 512M DDR2 SD RAM. From Fig. 8, 
we can observe the following facts:  1) AET increases with the 
degree of LFSR; 2) the maximum AET is approximately 5us at 
R1 and 16us at R2. That is negligible compared with the 
allowable coding time of 15ms for each frame. Therefore, we 
can safely conclude that our techniques very adequately meet 
the real-time requirement of VoIP. 
 
Fig. 8. The result of the test on AET per frame 
In our previous work, we attempted to adopt a simple en-
cryption scheme to encrypt secret messages before embedding 
operation. The encryption is based on an Exclusive OR 
operation between secret messages and a very large pseudo 
random number (PRN). We derived an efficient generation 
algorithm of PRN with arbitrary length from Mersenne Twiste 
[14] (a generation algorithm of PRN with 32 bits length). We 
ensured the privacy of our key by keeping the seed, the length 
and the generation algorithm secret, and encrypted the secret 
messages section by section. When used to transmit 1 MB 
secret messages, the steganography using the encryption 
increases the latency of VoIP system by about 4.7ms. While 
this latency is still acceptable considering the allowable 
maximum of 150ms one-way latency recommended by ITU-T 
G.114 [15], the m-sequence based technique proposed in this 
paper is significantly more efficient by encrypting the messages 
stream-like (bit by bit) during the coding process. Hence, we 
believe that the m-sequence based technique is a much better 
choice in the interest of maintaining the required performance 
of real-time services. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed a novel real-time steganography 
model for VoIP. The proposed model consists of three critical 
components: (1) a novel m-sequence encryption technique that 
eliminates the correlation among secret messages to resist the 
statistical steganalysis and provides a short-term secure 
protection for secret messages, (2) a well-known LSB substi-
tution that can provide an acceptable tradeoff between the 
adequate requirement for steganography and the low latency 
requirement for VoIP, and (3) a novel synchronization me-
chanism that ensures the accurate restitution of secret messages 
at the receiver side. Differing from the existing synchronization 
mechanisms, our mechanism introduces techniques of the 
protocol steganography for the transmission of synchronization 
patterns, which effectively minimizes the extra operations on 
voice samples and potentially reduces the operation time of 
synchronization patterns check. Moreover, this mechanism 
includes a method for secure online distribution of some 
important parameters, which makes it possible to construct the 
covert communication in real time without the need for advance 
offline communication requests. That is a significant strategy 
for enhancing the flexibility of the covert communication 
system. In addition, it is worth noting that this mechanism can 
also be extensively applied in other steganography schemes 
based on real-time systems.  We evaluated the effectiveness of 
our model with ITU-T G.729a as the codec of the cover speech 
in StegTalk. The experimental results show that our techniques 
provide good security and transparency for transmitting secret 
messages while very adequately meeting the real-time re-
quirement of VoIP. 
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